Laughing Through World War II: How the American Government and Radio Executives Imperceptibly Infused Propaganda into Entertainment Shows
Written by Erika MacKenzie
In this essay, I will discuss how radio executives and the American government used entertainment programs as a propaganda tool during World War II (WWII). Throughout WWII, nearly 90% of American families owned a radio set and listened to an average of three to four hours of radio a day (1). Americans relied on the radio more than any other communication tool for national and international news coverage about the war. The radio also played an instrumental role in constructing a national community and boosting morale during the war years. Given its popularity, the lack of scholarly attention to the radio during WWII is curious. To construct my analysis, I will mainly be relying on Gerd Horton’s book Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda During World War II in addition to other scholarly sources that discuss the role of the radio in America during World War II. I will also be using recordings of the radio programs This is War! and Fibber McGee and Molly as primary sources. First, I will outline the development of the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Network Allocation Plan (NAP) that it created to encourage radio executives to incorporate war messages into their programming. In the next section of the essay, I will detail how radio entertainment shows seamlessly infused war propaganda into their programming. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the World War II propaganda campaign for future American wars.
During WWII, the U.S. government instilled a new form of propaganda that was more discreet and undetectable than previous models, making it difficult for Americans to distinguish news from entertainment. This new model of propaganda revolutionized the way radio writers and advertisers addressed government messages for decades to come. Propaganda refers to the spreading of ideas or information, typically of a biased nature, for the purpose of advancing a particular cause or damaging an opposing cause (2). The pro-business and advertising movement of the post-depression era meant that WWII marked the end of government-sponsored radio and the beginning of privatized propaganda efforts (3). This new form of corporate-controlled propaganda was less overt than previous government-sponsored war mobilization and shifted into the realm of entertainment. In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt developed the OWI to provide Americans with information about the war and help boost morale. The OWI took advantage of the popularity of entertainment shows by incorporating war messaging into regular programming through the NAP (4). This plan instructed wartime radio writers to briefly discuss an important topic related to the war each week in their shows. The main rhetoric of the NAP was that “propaganda should be painless” (5). Programs like Fibber McGee and Molly used comedy to boost national morale and explain governmental goals in digestible terms (6). For instance, in the comedy show Easy Aces, one of the lead characters tries to explain the new war organization called the USO to his wife, who repeatedly conflates the U.S.O with the U.S.A., asking her husband if they’ve changed the name of the country (7). Radio dramas also incorporated war messaging into their programs. This is war! was a 13 episode show that wove dry statistics into emotional tales of world war and national mobilization (8). Albert Greco notes that the World War II propaganda campaign was the largest and most successful marketing campaign for uniting Americans toward a common goal in U.S. history (9).
The OWI was initially established to clear up confusion about the war among American people but eventually became a morale-boosting platform. The early war years were marked by confusion among Americans about the status of the war and America’s role in the conflict (10). In 1940 and 1941, President Roosevelt was reluctant to set up an agency designed to boost morale. He felt that the facts of the war would speak for themselves and was concerned that setting up this agency would indicate to his opponents that he was bringing propaganda into the homes of Americans (11). Despite his misgivings, Roosevelt was pressured by his supporters who were concerned that Americans were becoming apathetic toward the war. After the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, the demand for an information agency and the criticism of the current information service became more severe. In June 1942 Roosevelt established the OWI and elected respected CBS news commentator Elmer Davis as its director (12) Initially, Davis was not interested in morale-boosting and wanted to focus on straight news, but he soon realized that it was difficult to draw a sharp line between information and entertainment. That summer, the OWI polled Americans and discovered that many didn’t know the purpose of the war and were distrustful of the allies (13) Davis and his staff committed themselves to convincing Americans that their support of the allies was necessary to win the war and destroy fascism. Davis felt that the easier way to inject propaganda into Americans’ minds was to let it go through the medium of entertainment (14) Many Americans objected to defining the war in terms of an ideological struggle and criticized the OWI as a patronizing force (15) Although Davis knew that propaganda and news should be separate, he was forced to rely heavily on advertising and radio executives to sell the war. This increasingly blurry line between news and entertainment would have a wide range of implications not only for future propaganda campaigns, but also for modern journalism.
The infusion of government propaganda in radio shows not only benefited the U.S. government war efforts, it also secured profits for the radio industry. At the beginning of the Second World War, the head of the Domestic Radio Bureau of the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), William B. Lewis suggested using the radio’s popularity to approach wartime efforts (16) According to the NAP, radio programming would integrate war messages on a rotating schedule, twice a month for weekly shows and once a week for daily programming (17). The radio had to deal with the issue of skilfully imposing the war effort onto an existing structure. It required the collaboration of government agencies and the entire radio industry. Since the plan caused minimal disruption to the broadcasting schedule, it assured comfortable profit margins for the radio industry (18) Horton also explains that “while cooperation in the NAP was voluntary, wartime circumstances almost guaranteed the radio’s full collaboration” (19). This cooperation was due to the fact that radio executives saw propaganda campaigns as convenient means to protect their stars from the draft. The dissenting minority of shows were typically persuaded into compliance by the pressure of radio sponsors and advertisers. Horton notes that the NAP “demonstrated that a free media could effectively execute its war effort on a voluntary basis, adding credence to the conviction that democracy was a viable and preferable alternative to totalitarian fascist regimes” (20). This assertion articulates how the collaboration between the U.S. government and radio broadcasters was financially and ideologically beneficial to both the government and radio programs.
Radio comedy was an important platform for the government and radio executives to provide war messaging in digestible terms for Americans. According to OWI opinion polls, listeners became less sympathetic to “prodding” by government agencies as the war dragged on (21). As such, the OWI used comedy shows to incorporate propaganda in a way that was painless. Comedy became increasingly important during the Great Depression and into the war years because Americans used laughter as a source of catharsis (22). Horton highlights that much of the war messaging in comedy programs revolved around the rhetoric of sacrifice (23). For instance, Macdonald explains that at the time when it was important to raise money for wartime bond drives, entertainers like Eddie Cantor were the most successful businessmen (24). The Fibber McGee and Molly show dealt with political issues during the war years more than any other show (25). The show not only aided national morale, it also explained governmental goals in understandable and succinct terms. In December 1942, when gas rationing went into effect nationwide, Fibber McGee and Molly had a bit about gas usage in their comedy show (26):
Fibber McGee: I tell you it ain’t fair, Molly, they can’t do this to me— four gallons a week. Why that’s ridiculous.
Molly: I think so, too.
Fibber: You do?
Molly: Yes, you don’t need four gallons! (27)
Horton articulates that radio comedy “provided laughter as a means for achieving social cohesion and cross-cultural and cross-class harmony” (28). The example above illustrates that radio comedy was essential for boosting a nationalistic rhetoric revolving around sacrifice during WWII.
Radio executives also incorporated propaganda into wartime dramas in a way that pulled at Americans' heart strings in an effort to convince them of the importance of the war. This is War! was a thirteen episode show written and directed by Norman Corwin that wove dry statistics into a moving tale of war and national mobilization (29). Each episode contained official data about the war that was bundled into dramatic stories about soldiers who suffered at the hands of Axis forces and struggled to preserve their freedom from invading armies. According to Spiller, the series reached nearly 20 million people per week (30). One of the main aims of This is War! was to bring the war closer to the hearts of Americans. In one episode, Corwin wrote the following in reference to the war: "You too are in it, you and your family and your friends and your church” (31). Spiller explains that This is War! often employed gendered language to its discourse, particularly when describing the Axis forces (32). The writers
argued that Axis forces, who were characterized as savages, endangered the natural manly self-restraint necessary for Western civilization (33). The series defamed Nazis for their sexual degeneracy and control of family-based procreation. The episode “To the Young” explains that “[t]he Third Reich encourages the propagation of children out of wedlock. In that way they can take care of the mother and indoctrinate her as a good Nazi while she is waiting for her child to be born” (34). The show also advised women listeners on how they could contribute to the war effort without losing their womanly virtue. One episode suggested that women could fight the Axis forces by cultivating strong children and purchasing war bonds to limit inflation and finance war production (35). By incorporating Americans into the story of World War II and employing gendered language to create a dichotomy between civilization and savagery, This is War! worked to mobilize and inspire Americans to defend their way of living across the globe.
The government-corporate linked American propaganda during World War II created a discursive rhetoric of Americans as freedom fighters that had implications for future wars. Brewer highlights that World War II propaganda relied on the myth of the ‘good war’ which depicts an image of war nobly and selflessly fought to defeat evil (36). The author further notes that “[t]he challenge of disentangling history and myth owes a great deal to wartime propaganda’s role in the construction of American national identity at a pivotal point in U.S. history” (37). Since much of the wartime propaganda was infused, often indiscernibly, into entertainment shows, Americans were unable to distinguish reality from fiction. As such, the notion of America as a reluctant hero fighting for freedom was ingrained in the American imagination for years after the war (38). Moreover, maintaining the illusion of the voluntary nature of delivering and receiving propaganda furthered the belief that, when a democratic nation went to war, it could preserve some degree of individual freedom (39). The OWI efforts to integrate American citizens into the global sphere gave Americans the illusion that, after the war, they could go off and do what they liked because the world was their frontier. In future wars, officials used this ‘good war’ rhetoric to equate the enemy with Hitler. This analogy worked to absolve them of the need for detailed explanations of future conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq (40). This rhetoric of fighting to liberate the oppressed was particularly potent during the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom. Evidently, by relying on an image of America as a noble hero fighting for freedom, World War II propaganda justified America’s role in future wars.
In this essay, I have demonstrated how the U.S. government and radio executives cooperated to seamlessly integrate propaganda into entertainment programs. While the OWI was initially established to clear up confusion about the war, it became a morale-boosting agency designed to make Americans acknowledge the significance of the war. The NAP was created by the OWI to advise radio executives on how to integrate war messages into their programs. The OWI took advantage of the popularity of comedy shows to explain government goals in simple terms and encourage Americans to make sacrifices for the war effort. Wartime dramas like This is War! used emotional tales about war and national mobilization to encourage Americans to defend their way of life abroad. One of the implications of World War II propaganda was that it created a potent myth of America as a noble hero used for comparison to enemies in future wars. This illusion oversimplified the rationale for America’s involvement in future conflicts. This essay discusses how the interaction between knowledge and power can work to construct an image of reality that hides its creator’s bias. The OWI and radio executives infiltrated entertainment programs in such a way that Americans were unaware that they were being manipulated. In discussing propaganda, it is important to consider how media corporations benefit from advancing a certain message at the expense of providing citizens with the impartial truth. While media messaging may not always be accurate, it is nonetheless powerful in that it influences citizens’ perceptions of themselves and their country.
Endnotes
1. Gerd Horton, Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
2. “Propaganda,” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda
3. Horton, Radio Goes to War
4. Gerd Horton, Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
5. Horton, Radio Goes to War, 117
6. Fred J MacDonald, Don't Touch That Dial!: Radio Programming in American Life, 1920-1960 (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979)
7. Horton, Radio Goes to War
8. James Spiller, “This Is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America,” Journal of Radio Studies 11, no. 1 (November 2009): 55–72, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs1101_6
9. Albert N Greco, The Marketing of World War II in the Us, 1939-1946: A Business History of the Us Government and the Media and Entertainment Industries. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot, 2020), http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9783030395193.
10. Sydney Weinberg, “What to Tell America: The Writers' Quarrel in the Office of War Information,” The Journal of American History 55 no. 1 (June 1968): 73–89.
11. Weinberg, “What to Tell America”
12. Sydney Weinberg, “What to Tell America: The Writers' Quarrel in the Office of War Information,” The Journal of American History 55 no. 1 (June 1968): 73–89.
13. Weinberg, “What to Tell America”
14. James Spiller, “This Is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America,” Journal of Radio Studies 11, no. 1 (November 2009): 55–72, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs1101_6
15. Weinberg, “What to Tell America”
16. Gerd Horton, Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
17. Horton, Radio Goes to War
18. Horton, Radio Goes to War
19. Horton, Radio Goes to War, 130
20. Gerd Horton, Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 117
21. Horton, Radio Goes to War
22. Fred J MacDonald, Don't Touch That Dial!: Radio Programming in American Life, 1920-1960 (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979)
23. Horton, Radio Goes to War
24. MacDonald, Don’t Touch That Dial!
25. MacDonald, Don’t Touch That Dial!
26. Horton, Radio Goes to War
27. Fibber McGee and Molly, “Gasoline Rationing” Aired on December 1, 1942. Written by Don Quinn. NBC.
28. Gerd Horton, Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 136
29. James Spiller, “This Is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America,” Journal of Radio Studies 11, no. 1 (November 2009): 55–72, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs1101_6
30. Spiller, “This is War!”
31. This is War! “America at War.” Written by Norman Corwin. Aired February 14, 1942. NBC Papers. Box 494. Folder 1. Wisconsin State Historical Society Archives. Emphasis Added
32. Spiller, “This is War!”
33. Spiller, “This is War!”
34. This is War! “To the Young” Written by Norman Corwin. Aired May 2, 1942. NBC Papers. Box 494. Folder 1. Wisconsin State Historical Society Archives.
35. James Spiller, “This Is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America,” Journal of Radio Studies 11, no. 1 (November 2009): 55–72, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs1101_6
36. Susan A. Brewer, “Fighting For Freedom: The Second World War and a Century of American War Propaganda” Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age, ed. David Welch and Jo Fox, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 218–35
37. Brewer, “Fighting For Freedom”, 219
38. Brewer, “Fighting For Freedom”
39. Brewer, “Fighting For Freedom”
40. Brewer, “Fighting For Freedom”
References
Brewer, Susan A. 2012. “Fighting For Freedom: The Second World War and a Century of American War Propaganda.” In Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age, edited by David Welch and Jo Fox, 218–35. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Corwin, Norman, writer. This is War! “America at War.” Aired February 14, 1942. NBC Papers. Box 494. Folder 1. Wisconsin State Historical Society Archives.
Corwin, Norma, writer. This is War! “To the Young.” Aired May 2, 1942. NBC Papers. Box 494. Folder 1. Wisconsin State Historical Society Archives.
Greco, Albert N. 2020. The Marketing of World War II in the Us, 1939-1946: A Business History of the Us Government and the Media and Entertainment Industries. Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot. http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9783030395193.
Horton, Gerd. 2003. Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II. Berkeley: University of California Press.
MacDonald, J. Fred. 1979. Don't Touch That Dial!: Radio Programming in American Life, 1920-1960. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Quinn, Don, writer. Fibber McGee and Molly, “Mileage Rationing.” Aired on December 1, 1942. NBC. https://www.radioarchives.com/Fibber_McGee_and_Molly_Show_The_1942_1943_Season_p/ra371d.htm
Spiller, James. 2009. “This Is War! Network Radio and World War II Propaganda in America.” Journal of Radio Studies 11, no. 1 (November): 55–72. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506843jrs1101_6.
Weinberg, Sydney. 1968. “What to Tell America: The Writers' Quarrel in the Office of War Information.” The Journal of American History 55 no. 1 (June): 73–89.